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ABSTRACT
Reputation mechanisms at online opinion forums, such as
Amazon Reviews, elicit ratings from their users about the
experiences with products of unknown quality and critically
rely on these ratings being truthful. The peer prediction
method by Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser is arguably the
most prominent truthful feedback mechanism in the liter-
ature. An obstacle with regard to its application are the
strong common knowledge assumptions. Especially the com-
monly held prior belief about a product's quality, although
prevailing in economic theory, is too strict for this setting.
Two issues stand out in particular: rst, that dierent buy-
ers hold dierent beliefs and, second, that the buyers' beliefs
are often unknown to the mechanism. In this paper, we de-
velop an incentive-compatible peer prediction mechanism for
these reputation settings where the buyers have private be-
liefs about the product's inherent quality and the likelihood
of a positive experience given a particular quality. We show
how to exploit the temporal structure and truthfully elicit
two reports: one before and one after the buyer's experience
with the product. The key idea is to infer the experience
from the direction of the belief change and to use this direc-
tion as the event that another buyer is asked to predict.
1. INTRODUCTION
Almost every e-commerce website uses a reputation mecha-
nism that collects ratings from their users. Those reputation
mechanisms that are employed by online opinion forums,
such as Amazon Reviews, are built to eliminate asymmetric
information, and the objective is thus to reveal the inherent
quality of the products to future customers. For a general
overview of research on reputation mechanisms, we refer to
the survey article of Dellarocas [1].
A common feature of reputation mechanisms is the depen-
dency on honest buyer feedback. Most mechanisms in the
literature simply assume that feedback is reported honestly.
From a game-theoretic point this is problematic for two rea-
sons: the rst is the buyers' motivation to participate at
all. The feedback procedure requires the user to register an
account, to log in and to ll out forms describing her
1 expe-
riences. While this is time consuming and thus costly, the
reported information benets other customers but not the
reporting buyer herself, so that standard economic theory
predicts an under-provision of feedback. The second di-
culty is honesty. External interests, i.e. biases towards dis-
honest reporting, come from a variety of motivations. Imag-
1We refer to the buyers as female.
ine, for example, two companies competing for the same
group of customers. Either company has an incentive to
badmouth its competitor, to praise its own products or to
pay the rating buyers to do so. The truthful elicitation of
reputation feedback is thus crucial to incorporate into the
design of a reputation mechanism.
The peer prediction method developed by Miller, Resnick
and Zeckhauser [7] (henceforth, MRZ) incentivizes truthful
feedback. It pays a buyer for her feedback depending on the
feedback that was given about the same product by another
buyer. The intuition behind this method is that the quality
experiences of two buyers that have bought the same prod-
uct should be \essentially" identical. That is, dierences in
experiences can occur but are captured in a noise parameter.
Take a digital camera bought via Amazon as an example:
while dierent customers may experience dierent quality
due to noise in the production process, all buyers receive
the identical model.
The peer prediction method has fostered much research, in-
cluding the work by Jurca and Faltings [4, 5, 6] and our
own work [8, 9]. To the best of our knowledge, however, it
has not yet been applied. We conjecture that this is due to
its strong common knowledge assumptions. In particular,
it is assumed that every buyer shares the same prior belief
about the product's inherent quality and that the mecha-
nism knows this prior.
To support these assumptions, MRZ put forth that there
will be a sucient rating history available in many situa-
tions so that the mechanism can estimate the prior prob-
abilities. We argue that there is a logical aw in this ar-
gument as it leaves open the question as to how the rating
history itself was built: either people reported honestly with-
out an incentive-compatible mechanism in place, then we do
not need an incentive-compatible mechanism, or people re-
ported dishonestly in which case we cannot use these reports
to learn the prior. MRZ also suggest the possibility of an
extension to the peer prediction method that can incorpo-
rate non-common priors and other private information. In
a brief treatment, they propose a direct-revelation approach
in which the buyers, in addition to their experiences, also re-
port their prior belief on quality types and conditional signal
beliefs given a quality type. While this would be incentive
compatible, the proposal that we make in this paper is con-
siderably more simple with respect to the reporting costs,
and thus likely more practical.Instead of asking for all private information, our mechanism
only asks for two belief reports: one before the buyer receives
the product and one after. The change of reports allows the
mechanism to infer the received signal and use it to condition
the other buyers' payments. Proper incentives are provided
to elicit both reports truthfully. Moreover, while we ask
buyers to report probabilities, our user interface\hides"this
by using a point scale from 0 to 10 that allows buyers to
interact with the system in a way they are familiar with
from other online rating sites.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section we briey review proper scoring rules and the
peer prediction method.
2.1 Proper Scoring Rules
Proper scoring rules are functions that can be used to incen-
tivize self-interested, rational agents to truthfully announce
their private beliefs about the likelihood of a future event.
Definition 1 (Scoring Rule). A scoring rule R is a
function R : P  X ! R with nite X that assigns a nu-
merical score to each pair (p;x), where p is a probability
distribution and x is the event that eventually materializes.
Definition 2 (Strictly Proper Scoring Rule). A
scoring rule is said to be proper if it leads to an agent max-
imizing her expected score by truthfully reporting her belief
p 2 P and strictly proper if the truthful report is the only
report that maximizes the agent's expected score.
The procedure is as follows: rst, the agent is asked for her
belief report p 2 P. Second, an event x 2 X materializes
and, third, the agent receives payment R(p;x). An exam-
ple for such a strictly proper scoring rule is the logarithmic
rule that pays the agent log(px) where px is the belief that
the agent assigned to the materialized event x. While the
logarithmic rule always yields a negative score, there ex-
ist proper scoring rules that guarantee non-negative scores.
Moreover, if one applies a positive-ane transformation to
a proper scoring rule, the rule is still proper. For a more
detailed discussion of proper scoring rules, we refer to the
article by Gneiting and Raftery [2].
2.2 The Peer Prediction Method
In the peer prediction method [7], a group of rational, self-
interested buyers (henceforth agents) experiences the same
product or service. The quality of the product or service
(henceforth its type) is unknown and never revealed. Type 
is drawn out of a nite set of possible types  = f1;:::;Tg
with T  2 and, once determined by\nature", it is xed. All
agents share a common prior belief p(t) = Pr( = t) that
the product is of type t with
PT
t p(t) = 1 and p(t) > 0
for all t 2 .
The quality observations by the agents are noisy, so that,
after experiencing the product, an agent does not know
with certainty the product's actual type. Instead, she pri-
vately receives a signal drawn out of a set of signals: S =
fs1;:::;sMg. Let s
i denote the signal received by agent i
and let f(smjt) = Pr(s
i = smj = t) be the probabil-
ity that agent i receives the signal sm 2 S if the product
is of type t 2 . The signal observations again consti-
tute a probability distribution, i.e. for all t 2  we have: PM
m=1 f(smjT) = 1. It is assumed that dierent types gen-
erate dierent conditional signal distributions and that all
f(smj) are positive and common knowledge. In Section 3,
in addition to dropping the assumption of a common prior,
we also drop this assumption of a common-knowledge con-
ditional signal probability f(j).
The idea behind the peer prediction method is best ex-
plained with a simple example: say, there are two types,
G = 2 and B = 1, and two signals, s2 = h for high
and s1 = l for low. The type prior is p(G) = 0:7, and
the conditional signal probabilities are f(hjG) = 0:8 and
f(hjB) = 0:1. Note that p(G);f(hjG) and f(hjB) are com-
mon knowledge. When an agent experiences the product,
she receives either a high or a low signal and the mech-
anism's goal is to elicit this signal truthfully. While the
product's true type is never revealed, the mechanism can
compare the signal report of one agent with another agent's
signal report about the same product to create the right in-
centives. We refer to these agents as agent i and agent 3 i
(note that if i = 1, it holds that 3   i = 2 and vice versa).
For the mechanism to be truthful, agent i's best response
to a truthful report by agent 3   i must also be a truthful
report. The report of agent 3   i will play the role of the
event in a proper scoring rule.
The prior probability that agent i will receive a high sig-
nal, Pr(s
i = h) = f(hjG)  p(G) + f(hjB)  p(B) = 0:59,
can be computed because all elements of the equation are
common knowledge. Furthermore observe that, by expe-
riencing the product, agent i learns something about the
product's type. For example, following a high signal, she
updates her prior type belief p(G) = 0:7 to the type pos-
terior Pr(Gjs
i = h) =
f(hjG)p(G)
Pr(si=h) = 0:95. (The analo-
gous update following a low signal is 0:34.) Via this belief
update, agent i also learns something about the signal of
agent 3   i, and she can compute posterior signal beliefs
Pr(s
3 i = hjs
i = h) = 0:76 and Pr(s
3 i = hjs
i = l) = 0:34.
We know that proper scoring rules can be used to elicit prob-
abilistic beliefs about an uncertain event. In our setting, this
event that agent i shall predict is the signal report of agent
3 i. The peer prediction method takes advantage of the set-
ting's common knowledge and, instead of asking the agent
for her entire belief, oers her only two reports, namely a
high and a low report. Then, if the agent reports high, the
center knows that this corresponds to a belief of 0.76 and
computes the proper scoring rule with this number, with the
analogous holding true for a low report.
3. PRIVATE-BELIEF PEER PREDICTION
We relax the assumption of the peer prediction method in
two aspects. First, every agent has her own subjective be-
lief with respect to the size of the (hidden) type set, the
type priors and the conditional signal beliefs. Second, these
beliefs are private, i.e. only known to the respective agent.
Observe that the diculty comes primarily from the second
relaxation: if the center knew each agent's subjective be-
liefs, it could still compute the possible posterior beliefs for
the other agent's signal. This is impossible if the subjective
beliefs are also private.3.1 Straw Man Solutions
We give an intuition as to why the peer prediction method
cannot be readily extended to incorporate private beliefs in
a practical way. There are two problems: rst, it is no longer
sucient for the mechanism to only ask for signal reports
because it does not know the individual agent's signal pos-
teriors that are required for the proper scoring rule. This
could be solved by allowing for entire belief reports, but then
we run into a second problem which is more severe: without
the type priors and signal conditionals being common knowl-
edge, eliciting only the signal posterior does not enable the
center to infer the observed signal. Eliciting the signal is
crucial because it is used as the event that another agent
shall predict. Consider again our example numbers from
Section 2.2: if the center did not know that p(G) = 0:7,
f(hjG) = 0:8 and f(hjB) = 0:1, it could not infer anything
from the agent reporting her signal posterior belief to be
0:34 since this could, for example, also stem from a high
signal in a setting with p(G) = 0:06125 and the same sig-
nal conditionals. Another straw man solution is to ask the
agents for both a prior belief on the type or the signal and
the signal itself. However, it is then unclear how to incen-
tivize the agents to report their true signal since the center
can no longer compute the corresponding posterior without
knowing the conditional signal beliefs.
MRZ suggest a direct-revelation approach where the agents
are asked to report all private information, including the
prior beliefs on types, the signal beliefs conditional on types
and the signal itself. While this approach does not work if
all information is reported simultaneously, it is truthful if
the center ensures that the agent reports her private beliefs
before experiencing the product. However, we believe that
this approach is infeasible due to its high reporting costs.
Note that even in the smallest possible example with only
two types and two signals, the agent has to report three
distributions and a signal. Moreover, these reporting costs
grow in the number of types and signals, so that for the
second smallest setting with three types and two signals, it
would already require each agent to report ve distributions
and a signal.
This means that a dierent approach is required for settings
with private information in order to design a mechanism
that is both truthful and feasible with respect to the agents'
reporting costs.
3.2 The Setting
In our private-belief setting, the signal set S = fs1;s2g =
fl;hg is binary, and assumed to be common knowledge.
This assumption is crucial for the implicit way that we elicit
the signal reports. The true size of the type set, however,
is unknown and every agent holds a private belief about
it. We denote agent i's belief about the size of the type
set by T
i with T
i  2. In addition, both agent i's type
prior and her conditional signal probabilities are also pri-
vate information and denoted by p
i(t) and f
i(hjt), respec-
tively. It is assumed common knowledge that the higher
the type, the higher the probability for a high signal, i.e.
f
i(hjt+1) > f
i(hjt) for all t 2 f1;:::;T
i   1g and for all
i. We call
 
T
i;p
i();f
i(hj)

the model of agent i. Dierent
individual beliefs about a product's quality can for example
arise if one agent has read reviews about the product on
other rating websites which|depending on the trustworthi-
ness of these sites|may lead to better or worse estimates.
It is important to note that, independent of the individual
models, there is a true model (T;p();f(hj)) that is under-
lying the signals received by agents, which is unknown to
both the center and the agents. An agent's model is thus
subjective, and possibly wrong, while her signal observation
is correct by denition since it stems from the true model. It
is assumed that agents are risk-neutral and maximize their
expected payment.
3.3 The Incentive Scheme
When an agent observes a signal, she updates her type and
signal beliefs according to her model. The equations are
essentially the same as those that are used in the peer pre-
diction method. For reasons of clarity, we abbreviate the
belief of agent i about the posterior probability that agent
3   i received sk, given i received sj, as in Equation 1:
g
i(skjsj) = Pr
i(s
3 i = skjs
i = sj): (1)
We can compute g
i(skjsj) for every signal combination by
transforming Equation 1 until we are left with parameters
of the agent's model, i.e. about which she holds beliefs. The
rst step is to expand the conditional probability into a sum-
mation:
g
i(skjsj) =
Ti X
t=1
f
i(skjt)  Pr
i( = tjs
i = sj): (2)
Applying Bayes' rule to the second part of the summation
in Equation 2 yields:
Pr
i( = tjs
i = sj) =
f
i(sjjt)  p
i(t)
Pri(si = sj)
: (3)
The denominator of Equation 3 is the prior signal belief, and
can be computed with Equation 4:
Pr
i(s
i = sj) =
Ti X
t=1
f
i(sjjt)  p
i(t): (4)
With these, we have all necessary calculations to compute
agent i's posterior belief about agent 3 i's signal g
i(skjsj)
for all sk; sj 2 S.
In our setting, the reputation mechanism is situated at a
trusted intermediary (e.g., at Amazon) that ensures that
an agent can only give feedback about a product that she
has bought. The mechanism thus also knows when an agent
bought a product and we propose to elicit two signal belief
reports: one before and one after the signal observation. If
we can ensure that both reports are honest, we can infer
the signal through the belief change or, intuitively, \what
has been learned" by experiencing the product. To simplify
notation, we overload g
i and denote the individual prior sig-
nal belief by g
i(h) = Pr
i(s
3 i = h) = Pr
i(s
i = h) and the
individual posterior signal belief by g
i(hjsj) = Pr
i(s
3 i =
hjs
i = sj). The following observation follows from the fact
that f
i(hjt+1) > f
i(hjt) for all t 2 f1;:::;T   1g.
Proposition 1. For every agent i, it holds that g
i(hjh) >
g
i(h) > g
i(hjl).Agent i's two belief reports are denoted by r
i
1 and r
i
2, for
the prior signal belief and the posterior signal belief, re-
spectively. Agent i's implicit signal report, r
i, can then be
inferred in the following way:
r
i =

h; if r
i
2 > r
i
1
l; if r
i
2 < r
i
1
(5)
Note that Proposition 1 states that g
i(h) 6= g
i(hjsj). Never-
theless, to keep the user interface as simple as possible, we
still allow the two reports to be equal and also pay the agent
as described subsequently. We do not, however, use her re-
ports to score another agent but randomly choose another
agent.
Now that we have explained how to infer an implicit signal
report from the dierence in signal belief reports, we can
proceed by assuming honest belief reports by agent 3   i
and designing strict incentives for honest belief reports by
agent i. Since the signal observations themselves are not
subjective but stem from the true model, we can simply use
the inferred signal of agent 3   i to condition the payment
to agent i using a proper scoring rule: assume that agent
3   i honestly reports her beliefs, i.e. r
3 i
1 = g
3 i(h) and
r
3 i
2 = g
3 i(hjsk), so that we can infer the honest signal
sk = s
3 i = r
3 i by applying Equation 5. Agent i is then
simply paid according to a proper scoring rule for each of
her two reports:
R(r
i
1;r
3 i) + R(r
i
2;r
3 i):
Putting this all together, the mechanism's procedure is as
follows:
1. Agent i holds prior belief g
i(h) about her own and
agent 3   i's signal. She privately reports belief r
i
1.
2. Agent i experiences the product, i.e. receives a signal
s
i = sj. She updates her signal belief to g
i(hjsj) and
privately reports r
i
2.
3. The analogous sequence of steps for agent 3   i: she
reports a signal prior r
3 i
1 , receives a signal s
3 i = sk
and reports a signal posterior r
3 i
2 .
4. Agent i's reports are scored against 3 i's inferred sig-
nal r
3 i and agent i receives R(r
i
1;r
3 i)+R(r
i
2;r
3 i).
Theorem 2. The mechanism described in Section 3.3 is
perfect-Bayesian incentive compatible.
We give an informal sketch of the proof. Consider agent
i's reporting decision before experiencing the product. Her
knowledge is reected by her model with which she can com-
pute her subjective belief of a high signal (Equation 4). Note
that the rst report of an agent does not inuence the pay-
ment for the second report of an agent. This simplies the
analysis, in that the (strict) best response condition then
implies sequential rationality, so that the former is sucient
for incentive compatibility. Since she will be paid according
to a strictly proper scoring rule, her expected payment is
uniquely maximized through an honest report of r
i
1 = g
i(h).
Remember that the subjective signal beliefs are valid for
both her own signal and the signals of any other agent draw-
ing from the same true model. The argument for the second
report is analogous: once agent i receives a signal s
i = sj,
she updates her subjective signal belief and|given that she
is paid according to a strictly proper scoring rule|uniquely
maximizes her expected payment through an honest report
of r
i
2 = g
i(hjsj).
In contrast to the original peer prediction method, individ-
ual rationality cannot be achieved with every proper scoring
rule. The logarithmic rule, for example, can be used for
the original peer prediction method but not for our private-
belief mechanism. The logarithm for any number in the in-
terval between 0 and 1 is never positive. In the original peer
prediction method, the center knows all M possible signal
posteriors and their respective logarithm. There, it is thus
possible to add a constant to every payment such that the
logarithmic rule plus this constant is non-negative for any
possible signal report. In our setting with private models,
however, an agent's signal posterior can take values arbi-
trarily close to 0. This means that there is no lower bound
for the possible scores, and this makes it impossible to nd
a suitable constant to add.
Fortunately, there are strictly proper scoring rules that guar-
antee non-negative values for any possible report. An exam-
ple for such a rule is the binary quadratic rule with an added
constant of 1 and scaled by 0.5:
R(p;r
3 i = h) = 2p   p
2
R(p;r
3 i = l) = 1   p
2 (6)
For example, if agent i reports belief p = 0:8 for a high
signal, she will receive 0.96 if agent 3 i reports high and 0.36
if agent 3   i reports low. Since every agent is guaranteed
a non-negative payment, the private-belief peer prediction
mechanism with the transformed proper scoring rule from
Equation 6 is ex-post individually rational.
Note: A property of our mechanism is that buyers have
to report probabilities. The user interface, however, \hides"
these by using a point scale from 0 to 10. These points
directly correspond to probabilities but instead of asking
for probability reports, it allows buyers to interact with the
system in a way they are familiar with from other online
rating sites.
3.4 Example
In this section, we briey exemplify the mechanism with an
agent buying a digital camera from Amazon. For reasons of
simplicity, we use the same numbers as in the example of
Section 2.2, so imagine the agent believes that there are two
types, G = 2 and B = 1. Her prior type belief is p
i(G) =
0:7, and her conditional signal beliefs are f
i(hjG) = 0:8
and f
i(hjB) = 0:1. The procedure using the transformed
quadratic scoring rule from Equation 6 is then as follows:
1. The agent buys a digital camera from Amazon.
2. Amazon asks for her rst signal belief report r
i
1 and
she truthfully reports 5.9 points, which the mechanism
interprets as g
i(h) = 0:59.3. Some days later, the agent receives and experiences the
camera. She is disappointed with the picture quality,
so her signal is low. She updates her signal belief to
g
i(hjl) = 0:34 and truthfully reports 3.4 points.
4. Another agent buys the same camera from Amazon
and also follows Steps 1 to 3, with potentially dierent
beliefs and experiences.
5. Our agent is scored against the other agent's implic-
itly reported signal. Imagine that the other agent
was happy with the camera, then our agent is paid
R(0:59;h) + R(0:34;h) = 2   0:59
2   0:34
2 = 1:54.
3.5 Information Aggregation
Left to discuss is how the elicited signals can be aggregated,
i.e. how the elicited information is fused into a joint rating.
In the standard peer prediction method, one can use the
true model to compute the true signal posteriors. That is,
using Bayesian updating, the center can publish its belief
that an agent will receive a high signal, i.e. have a positive
experience with the product.
In our setting there are two natural choices. Even without
beliefs, since the signals are objective, publishing the per-
centage of high signals of all elicited signals gives us a rst
approximation. Alternatively, the center could maintain its
own beliefs, that it uses only for the aggregation.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a mechanism for eliciting
truthful reputation feedback that is in the spirit of the peer
prediction method but does not rely on the same strong
common knowledge assumptions. We believe that this de-
velopment is of signicant practical importance. In addi-
tion to truthful feedback elicitation on online opinion forums
such as Amazon Reviews [e.g., 3, 4, 5, 6], the mechanism
described in this paper can also be applied to online auc-
tion sites, such as eBay [e.g., 9]. In particular, we see a
good t with our work on escrow mechanisms [10], which
establish trust and cooperation between traders on online
auction sites without a history of feedback reports, and for
an intermediary without distributional information on buyer
valuations. Introducing the peer prediction method from
this paper further enhances the practicality of these escrow
mechanisms by removing the need for common knowledge
amongst buyers about seller types. For future work, we see
several exciting directions:
Learning the True Model
So far, we propose to simply publish the percentage of high
signals that were implicitly reported by the agents. As men-
tioned earlier, an alternative is that the center itself has a
model that it uses to aggregate information. Instead of as-
suming that the center has its own model, the center can
learn this from the rich information that each agent pro-
vides. At this point, we use the two signal belief reports
that an agent provides to infer a binary signal. Interest-
ingly, the score that an agent receives for her two reports
depends on her exact reports and not only the inferred sig-
nal, with higher payments corresponding to better informa-
tion. In this respect, our mechanism can itself be regarded
as a scoring rule that incentivizes agents to be truthful but
also estimates their private models. We plan to use this
latter property to learn an agent's private model.
System-Wide Perspective
In the setting of Section 3, we consider each product in isola-
tion, in that the report of an agent for one product does not
change the publication of reports for any other product. In
reality, some agents will inherently have better information
than others. This can be due to some of them studying many
product reviews before buying a product or, alternatively,
because they are domain experts, i.e. they have a lot of ex-
perience with similar products. In future work, we will take
a system-wide perspective and take into consideration these
inherent dierences in agent characteristics. Combining this
with a more sophisticated information aggregation scheme,
this will improve the forecasting abilities of our mechanism
which is especially useful for event products, such as con-
certs or festivals. Due to the one-shot nature of these set-
tings, there cannot be any ratings from former customers. It
is thus crucial to use the rst of the two reports to already
estimate the event's quality beforehand. This is possible if
there is a correlation between the accuracies of an agent's
reports for dierent products.
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